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COMMENTS
Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation
in Consumer Class Actions
It is precisely because the class action deters the robber barons
from plundering the poor that it has been hailed as a very important supplement to law enforcement. Take away the class action
and the joy of those who live off the small consumer will, as in the
bad old days, be unconfined.1
The 1966 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 2
I. Letter from Abraham L. Pomerantz to the Financial Editor, N.Y. Times, April 25,
1971, § 3, at 22, col. 8. This letter was in response to an article by Milton Handler,
Massive Class Actions: A Liability, N.Y. Times, April 4, 1971, § 3, at 12, cols. 3-8. See
also Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits,
26 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 124 (1971), 71 CoLUM. L. REv. l (1971). A bibliography of
selected materials on class actions is collected in 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 412 (1971).
2. Amended Rule 23 was adopted by Order of the Supreme Court, 383 U.S. 1031
(1966), along with additional amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on
Feb. 28, 1966, effective July 1, 1966. Rule 23 presently provides:

CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or

be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions afjecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brou~ht as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained,
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits.
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was designed in large measure to fulfill the "historic mission of
taking care of the smaller guy." 8 It had been generally recognized
that the classification of class actions according to jural relationships4 under the former rule had become unworkable; 5 the rule
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion;
and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided
in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and
whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of
proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication
in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice
be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of
any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into
the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on int<:rvenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined
with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable
from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the
court directs.
3. Statement by Benjamin Kaplan, quoted in Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a
Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRusr B.J. 295, 299 (1966). See also Ford, Federal Rule
23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, IO B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. R.Ev. 501 (1969).
4. Prior to the 1966 amendments, class actions under Rule 23 were classified according to the character of the right sought to be enforced. These types of class
suits became popularly known as true ("joint, or common, or secondary in the
sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it"), hybrid ("several, and the
object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific
property involved in the action''), and spurious ("several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is
sought''). The label applied often determined jurisdictional requirements, the binding
effect of the judgment, and the application of the statute of limitations. See Moore,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25
GEo. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937); Moore &: Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307
(1937).
5. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98-99 (1966) [hereinafter Advisory
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was- amended with the intention of elucidating in- more practical
terms the proper occasions for maintaining a class action. 6 Early suits
brought under the amended rule concentrated in the antitrust and
securities fraud areas,7 largely because an Advisory Committee Note
appended to Rule 23 made specific mention of the likelihood that
private antitrust damage suits and suits for fraud arising from a
common misrepresentation would be properly maintainable as class
actions. 8 Recently, federal legislation has been proposed to provide
more effective consumer0 remedies, and these proposals generally
rely heavily upon the operation of Rule 23 for implementation.10
This Comment will examine the likelihood that Rule 23, as it has
been interpreted since its amendment, will provide a mechanism
through which consumers may successfully resolve their grievances.
The focus will be on the manageability problems of providing the
requisite notice and of devising a method of calculation and distribution of damages.

I. REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23
Subsection (a) of Rule 23 contains four necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that must be fulfilled if a suit is to be properly
maintained as a class action. 11 These preconditions largely reflect
criteria contained in the former rule. 12 However, while under the
former rule the binding effect of a judgment was largely determined
by the jural relationship involved,13 it was thought that since the
Note]; Z. CHAFEE, SoME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 244-58 (1950); Kalven &: Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 702-07 (1941).
6. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 99. See also Weinstein, Revision of Procedure:
Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 433 (1960).
7. 2 W. BARRON &: A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 562, at 76
(C. Wright ed., Supp. 1970); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 23-45(2], at 758 (2d ed.
1969) (hereinafter MooRE]; C. WruGllT, FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 312 (2d ed. 1970);
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL§ 1781 (1972).
8. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 103.
9. The term "consumer" will be used in its broadest sense throughout this Com•
ment. It will generally be the case that class actions are maintained when the damages
suffered by individuals are an insufficient inducement to the assertion of legal rights
and that only by forming a class and sharing litigation expenses does suit become
feasible. Additionally, consumer class actions will ordinarily have at their roots con•
tractual transactions from which actions for breach of contract or for related torts
(e.g., fraud) arise. See Starrs, Continuing Complexities in the Consumer Class Action,
49 J. URBAN LAw 349 (1971).
10. E.g., S. 984, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (Consumer Class Action Act of 1971);
H.R. 1078, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (amendment to the Federal Trade Commission
Act). Both proposals provide that the federal courts shall have original jurisdiction in
actions brought under the proposed statutes. On the general topic of possible legislative
approaches, see Leete, The Right of Consumers To Bring Class Actions in the Federal
Courts-An Analysis of Possible Approaches, 33 U. PITT, L. REv. 39 (1971).
11. See note 2 supra. See also Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 100.
12. 2 w. BARRON&: A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 7, § 562, at 63; MOORE, supra note 7,
1J 23.02-03, at 201; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, § 1759.
13. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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amended rule contempl<!,ted broader res judicata application,14 the
courts would apply more demanding standards to assure that the
class was properly and adequately represented.15 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, the first federal appellate court to consider the
adequacy of representation under the amended rule, required only
that the class be represented by competent counsel and that the possibility of a collusive suit between the litigants be eliminated as
much as possible.16 Similar standards have been applied in other
cases. 17 The other criteria prescribed in Rule 23(a) are either not
often challenged by the defendant18 or are so similar to other requirements that must be satisfied that courts analyze them in connection with other subdivisions of the rule. 19
Subsection (b) of Rule 23 describes the additional elements that
must be satisfied in order to maintain a class action. 20 An action
must meet the requirements of one of the three categories of subsection (b). Class actions may be brought under Rule 23(b)(l) when
their use will eliminate undesirable effects that might result from
nonclass suits brought by or against individual members of the class.
Actions brought under this subsection might well be classified as
"protective" class actions, with subsection (b)(l)(A) designed to protect the party opposing the class and subsection (b)(l)(B) providing
for a class action when the rights of class members not parties to the
original action might otherwise be jeopardized. Subsection (b)(l)(A)
provides that a class action may be brought when the prosecution
of separate actions creates a risk that incompatible standards of conduct might be established for the party opposing the class. The
examples suggested by the Advisory Committee-the invalidation
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)-(3), set out in note 2 supra. The Advisory Committee
realized that the court conducting the action could not predetermine the res judicata
effect of its judgment, but noted:
The court, however, in framing the judgment in any suit brought as a class action,
must decide what its e.xtent or coverage shall be, and if the matter is carefully
considered, questions of res judicata are less likely to be raised at a later time
and if raised will be more satisfactorily answered.
Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 106. See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 72, at 314.
15. MooRE, supra note 7, -;[ 23.02-03, at 202; 7 C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, supra note 7,
§ 1765; Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968).
17. E.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465,
468-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
18. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971) (impracticability of joinder); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (typical claims
or defenses).
19. E.g., Vernon J. Rockier &: Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335 (D.
Minn. 1971) (common questions of law or fact); Koehler v. Ogilvie, 53 F.R.D. 98 (N.D.
Ill. 1971) (adequacy of representation and typical claims combined in analysis). See
generally Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, IO B.C. IND.
&: CoM. L. REv. 527 (1969).
20. See note 2 supra.
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of bond issues or the duties of riparian owners21-are very different
from the issues involved in the typical consumer class action.
Accordingly, one commentator has urged that actions for money
damages should not qualify under subsection (b)(l)(A) because the
payment of damages to members of a class does not create the "incompatible standards of conduct" within the meaning of that limitation:
This phrase implies that the separate judgments will affect an opposing party's continuing course of conduct brought into issue by the
suits and not that the judgments will cause inconsistent isolated
actions. In the damages example, the payment or nonpayment of
money damages are single inconsistent actions which may not affect
the party's continuing course of conduct.22

Furthermore, to the extent that a consumer class action is brought
under the premise that consumers are financially unable to prosecute
their grievances individually, the corresponding risk that individual
suits would establish incompatible standards of conduct is reduced. 28
Subsection (b)(l)(B) permits a class action when a judgment in
a nonclass action involving a member of the class would as a practical matter jeopardize the interests of class members not parties
to the suit. Except in limited instances when claims are made by
many persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims,24 damage claims are unlikely to qualify under subsection (b)(l)(B). Therefore, consumer class actions are unlikely to fall within the parameters of either the subsection (b)(l)(A) or (b)(l)(B) provisions.2 r;
A class action under subsection (b)(2) arises when "the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class."26 A subsection (b)(2) suit is appropriate
when the remedy applicable is "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief."27 While the subsection does not provide
that damages may never be sought or awarded, the Advisory Committee was careful to state that a subsection (b)(2) action was not
appropriate when "the appropriate final relief relates exclusively
or predominantly to money damages."28 It is clear that this provision
21. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 100.
22. Sabbey, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. &: Coll!. L. R.Ev. 539,
540-41 (1969).
23. Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968), criticized in 44
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 198, 201-02 (1969).
24. See Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 101.
25. See Travers &: Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KAN. L. R.Ev. 811, 823-24
(1970).
26. See note 2 supra.
27. See note 2 supra.
28. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 102.
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was designed primarily to allow class actions in the civil-rights field,
and although the Committee expressly states that a subsection (b)(2)
suit is not limited to civil-rights cases,29 one commentator has urged
that it should be so limited.80 Although a consumer class action
could conceivably be brought seeking injunctive relief, it is far more
likely that consumer actions will seek primarily monetary recoveries
since the economic justification for a class action procedure is based
on the idea that only by forming a class are consume~ likely to bring
suit to recover the small damages that they individually have suffered.
If, as in the case of civil-rights actions, a particular consumer cause
can generate public donations to support a legal action,81 then a subsection (b)(2) suit seeking injunctive relief could be maintained upon
the requisite showing that the adverse party had acted on grounds
generally applicable to the class, but otherwise few consumer class
actions will be permitted under Rule 23(b)(2).
Therefore, despite an early prediction that not many subsection
(b)(3) actions would be permitted,82 the vast majority of consumer
class actions are likely to be brought under this subsection. The court
must make two threshold determinations in order to allow such
a suit. First, it must determine that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over individual
questions. 33 In the securities and antitrust fields, this requirement
has generally been met in favor of the class by holding that the
issue of liability arising from a common misrepresentation or a conspiracy predominates over the individual damage issues.84 Often the
courts proceed to order a single trial to determine liability and separate trials to establish damages incurred by individual members. 85
A warning by the Advisory Committee that a fraud case may be
unsuitable for treatment as a class action when material variations
in the representations and degrees of reliance exist86 may explain
the reluctance of courts to allow class actions in consumer fraud
cases.37 A recent California case suggests, however, that the com29. Id.
30. Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 648-49
(1965).
31. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 435.
32. Wright, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Procedure, 42 F.R.D. 552, 567
(1966). For a later contrary conclusion, see Travers & Landers, supra note 25, at 824.
33. See note 2 supra. It is at this stage that the court usually examines Rule 23(a)(2).
See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
34. E.g., Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., 326 F. Supp. 98 (D. Colo. 1971); City
of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971); Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
35. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(4), set out in note 2 supra.
36. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 103.
37. Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 ORE. L. REv. 21, 31-34 (1970); Smit,
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monality of fact ·may be supplied by the showing of a pattern of
misrepresentation.38 Although there may be difficulties in bringing
consumer class actions for fraud, in many other consumer areas the
necessity of showing a predominance of common questions is not
likely to be determinative.
The court must further determine under subsection (b)(3) that
a class action is superior to other methods of fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The rule suggests four pertinent
matters to be examined in making this determination, 30 the most
important of which is an assessment of "the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action." 40 The other re•
quirements of subsections (a) and (b)(3) have generally been interpreted favorably for those seeking a class action, and the assessment
of difficulties in managing the suits reflects the final, and yet most
substantial, hurdle faced by class action advocates. It is only recently
that courts have found it necessary to focus directly on the manage•
ability limitations to class actions as the other more preliminary
objections raised by defendants have gradually been resolved in
favor of maintenance of class actions.
Since the federal rule was amended in 1966, commentators and
courts have forecast that a substantial burden would be placed on
the court system as an increased number of class actions would be
maintained.41 In Snyder v. Harris, 42 the Supreme Court cited the
expansion of the federal caseload43 when it considered whether the
amended federal rule had changed the then prevailing rule that
plaintiffs may aggregate only commonly held claims or rights 44 in
satisfying the minimum jurisdictional amount in controversy.46 In
holding that the amendment to Rule 23 did not change the interpretation of the phrase "matter in controversy" for jurisdictional
purposes and that separate and distinct claims could not be aggreAre Class Actions for Consumer Fraud a Fraud on the Consumer?, 26 Bus. LAW. 1053,
1061-63 (1971).
38. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 811-13, 484 P.2d 964, 971-72, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 803-04 (1971).
39. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D), set out in note 2 supra.
40. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3)(D), set out in note 2 supra.
41. Frequently this assertion is supported by citation to a recent volume of Federal
Rules Decisions showing the large number of class actions reported. See, e.g., Dole,
The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71 CoLUM. L. REV. 971 n.l (1971). No
comprehensive statistical analysis has yet been made of the actual impact of the
amended rule on the federal caseload, but it is nevertheless clear that many courts
proceed on the assumption that the impact of the rule has been significant.
42. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
43. 394 U.S. at 339-40.
44. 394 U.S. at 335-36. See also C. WrucHT, supra note 7, § 72, at 315.
45. 28 u.s.c. § 1332 (1970).
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gated, the Court resorted to the jural relationships that had prevailed
under the former rule, thereby resurrecting a classification that the
amended rule had sought to bury. 46 Most class actions brought under
either subsection (b)(l) or (b)(2) will meet federal jurisdictional
standards through compliance with the traditional aggregation requirements47 or alternative jurisdictional provisions. 48 However,
most suits sought to be maintained as class actions under Rule 23
(b)(3), which generally arise in the consumer context out of separate but similar transactions, will be denied since the rights asserted
are "several" and aggregation is precluded.49 Commentators have
called for statutory modification to allow aggregation in class actions, 60 and the Snyder decision has been the impetus for proposed
federal legislation to eliminate the requirement of a minimum
amount in controversy in certain consumer areas. 51
There is little question that Snyder represents a partial defeat
of the purpose of the amended rule. 52 But those who argue that Rule
23 is ineffective for consumer class actions because of the limitations
imposed by Snyder and the inadequacy .of state class action procedures53 have overlooked the significant areas in which jurisdictiqnal amounts in controversy need not be demonstrated and have
failed to foresee the impact of the federal rule upon the states. At
least ten states now have rules substantially identical to the amended
federal rule,54 and additional states that generally follow the federal
46. See 394 U.S. at 343.44 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
47. By the nature of the rights involved in Rule 23(b)(l) suits, the action is likely
to fall within the meaning of common and undivided rights for which aggregation is
permitted. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 72, at 315-16.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), which grants jurisdiction in civil-rights cases without
regard to an amount in controversy, is likely to cover most Rule 23(b)(2) suits. See text
accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
49. See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
50. E.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 72, at 316.
51. See note 10 supra.
52. Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. REv. 497, 497-98 (1969); Note,
Aggregation Doctrine Continues To Limit Class Actions, 24 Sw. L.J. 354 (1970); Note,
Federal Courts and Procedure-Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 37 TENN. L.
REv. 103 (1969); Note, Taxpayer Suits and the Aggregation of Claims: The Vitiation
of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALE L.J. 1577 (1970). Cf. Maraist & Sharp, After Snyder v. Harris:
Whither Goes the Spurious Class Action?, 41 Miss. L.J. 379 (1970).
53. For discussions of the various forms that class actions may take and specific
state provisions, see Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 CoLuM.
L. REv. 609 (1971); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II, Considerations of
Procedure, 49 B.U. L. REv. 407, 424-63 (1969).
54. ARiz. R. C1v. P. 23 (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Supp. 1971); CoLO. R. CIV. P. 23
(Colo. Rev. Stat. 1970); DEL. R. CHANCERY Cr. 23 (Del. Code Ann. 1971); IND. R. TRIAL
P. 23 (Ind. Ann. Stat., Burns Supp. 1970); MINN. R. C1v. P. 23 (Minn. Stat. Ann. 1968);
MoNT. R. CIV. P. 23 (Mont. Rev. Code Supp. 1971); Omo R. CIV. P,23 (1 Jacoby Ohio
Civ. Practice 1970); S. DAK. R. CIV. P. 15-6-23 (S. :Oak, Comp. Laws-Supp •. 19.71); T.eNN.
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rules are likely to amend their class action rules. Furthermore, state
courts often look to the federal rules for direction, notwithstanding
the language of their own class action statutes.66 In the many class
actions that still will be brought on the federal and state levels, it is
the problem of manageability that will question the effectiveness of
the class action as a meaningful device for consumers. The problem
challenges the ingenuity of the courts to develop a method of
handling class actions that will redress valid consumer grievances.
In those jurisdictions that follow the amended federal rule, the
analysis of manageability is clearly suggested by Rule 23(b)(3)(D),
but in all jurisdictions with any form of class action, the assessment
of manageability should be an implicit and frequently controlling
determination. Particular attention should be given to the problems
inherent in providing notice in Rule 23(b)(3) actions and in calculating and distributing damages.
II.

ILLUSTRATIVE MANAGEABILITY PROBLEMS-RECENT CASES

The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
large class actions are illustrated by two recent federal district court
cases. Both decisions focus on anticipated problems of manageability,
with one decision upholding a consumer class action and the other
rejecting it. In Eisen v. Carlisle & ]acquelin, 66 an investor brought
an action against the two major odd-lot dealers on the New York
Stock Exchange alleging that they had conspired and combined to
monopolize odd-lot trading and had charged excessive fees in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 67 In a separate count, the plaintiff also charged the New York Stock Exchange with breach of the
duties prescribed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.68 Eisen
sought to represent himself and all odd-lot purchasers and sellers
between 1962 and 1966, a group estimated initially at 3.75 million
investors59 and later determined to approximate 6 million. 00 In
response to defendants' motion under Rule 23(c)(l) that the class
action not be permitted, the district court held that the plaintiff
had not demonstrated that he could adequately represent the class
R. CIV. P. 28 (Tenn. Code Ann. Supp. 1970);
1968).

WASH,

R. C1v. P. 28 (Wash. Rev. Coclc

55. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 708-09, 438 P.2d 782, 742, 68
Cal. Rptr. 724, 734 (1967).
56. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.), motion to dismiss interlocutory appeal denied, 870 F.2d
119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967), revd. and remanded 011 the merits,
391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), decided, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
57. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1-2 (1970).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 78f(d), 78s(a} (1970).
59. 41 F.R.D. at 151 n.2.
60. 52 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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as required by Rule 23(a)(4); nor that he would be able to comply
with the notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2); nor that common
questions predominated over individual issues of law or fact as
required by Rule 23(b)(3). 61 Although the court refused to certify
the class action, it did not dismiss the action in so far as it related
to Eisen's individual claims, and it made no ruling on the merits
of the allegations. 62
Eisen appealed the refusal by the district court to certify the
class action. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the order had not been final because
the plaintiff was still able to pursue his individual claim. 63 Thereafter, in a widely noted decision,64 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding. The court of
appeals found that common questions did indeed predominate
over individual issues despite the defendants' arguments that the
class of purchasers and sellers of odd-lot shares had diverse motives
and interests. It remanded the case for a determination of the adequacy of representation and a resolution of the notice problems
and further directed the district court to consider the mechanics
involved in the administration of the action. The court carefully
stated: "However, we do not express any opinion on this subject
[of administrative feasibility] and we simply note that other courts
in similar cases have been able to set up formulas of procedure for
recovery that are applicable to an entire class." 65 Chief Judge
Lumbard dissented, arguing that the impossibility of proper notice
and the unmanageability of the suit precluded a class action. 66
On remand, after an additional hearing that directed the parties
to submit further data, 67 Judge Tyler-who had made the determination five years earlier that a class action was not maintainablemade detailed finding-s of fact based on submissions by the parties.
Specifically, he found: (a) approximately 6 million shareholders had
odd-lot transactions during the period in question; (b) the average
shareholder had approximately 5 odd-lot transactions during this
time, with an average odd-lot differential per transaction of $5.18;
(c) of the 6 million shareholders, 2 million could be identified
61. 41 F.R.D. at 150-52.
62. 41 F.R.D. at 152.
63. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966). See generally Note, Interlocutory Appeal from
Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1292 (1970). Cf. Note,
Civil Procedure-Finality of Determination Under Federal Rule 23(cX1), 48 N.C. L.
REV. 626 (1970).
64. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), noted in 18 AM. U. L. REv. 225 (1968), 44 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 198 (1969), and 44 NOTRE DAME LAw. 151 (1968).
65. 391 F.2d at 567.
66. 391 F.2d at 570-72.
67. 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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through a correlation of the defendants' records with computer tapes
maintained by 14 of the largest brokerage firms; 68 (d) the names
and addresses of the remaining two thirds of the class could not be
identified with reasonable effort; and (e) through a random sample,
it was estimated that almost 2,000 members had 10 or more oddlot transactions during the period in question. 00 Judge Tyler also
considered an analysis of the costs incurred in administration of 2
other large class actions70 and the projected costs of providing notice
to members of the Eisen class.71
Applying the criteria set forth by the court of appeals,72 Judge
Tyler had little difficulty concluding that the class was adequately
represented. He noted the conduct of plaintiff's counsel as evidence
of his capability and the fervor of the litigation as demonstration
of the lack of collusion between the parties.78 Recognizing that
manageability posed "the most difficult question to be considered
by this court,'' 74 Judge Tyler considered various aspects of the
problem of damage calculation and distribution. He concluded that
by using the defendants' records and studies conducted for or by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on odd-lot trading
it was possible to estimate gross damages without requiring the
filing of individual claims by each class member. 76 Relying on the
experience from the antibiotic drug cases76 to appraise the mechanics
of administration, Judge Tyler attempted to estimate the expenses
of providing the necessary notice and processing of claims and concluded that the total sum required was about $500,000. 77 He further
stated that claims could be proved by verification or certification by
a claimant's broker-dealer or the records of the individual claimants.78 Judge Tyler recognized the necessity of assuring that class
members would share in any eventual judgment and found it appro68. These brokerage firms transmit their customers' orders directly by teletype to
the defendants. The defendants maintain computer tapes on which are recorded the
transactions of each wire firm customer. By comparing the transactional data recorded
by the defendants with the names and addresses recorded by the brokers, the members
of the class may be identified. 52 F.R.D. at 257.
69. 52 F.R.D. at 257, 259.
70. 52 F.R.D. at 259-60, discussing West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer&: Co., 314 F. Supp.
710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3166 (U.S.
Oct. 12, 1971); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass.
1962).
71. 52 F.R.D. at 263, 267-68. See notes 152-53 infra and accompanying text.
72. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
73. 52 F.R.D. at 261.
74. 52 F.R.D. at 261.
75. 52 F.R.D. at 262.
76. See text accompanying notes 189-97 infra.
77. 52 F.R.D. at 263.
78. 52 F.R.D. at 263.
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priate to consider the possibility of a "fluid class recovery," in which
any unclaimed portion of a damage award would be used to benefit
the entire class by applying the damage fund to reduce the odd-lot
differential charged by the defendants in the future. 79 While not
definitively ruling on the precise form that such a distribution
scheme might take, he was satisfied that the concept had sufficient
merit to assure that some method of distribution would be possible. 80 Comparing the probable administrative costs with the range
of damages that would be awarded upon a finding of liability, Judge
Tyler concluded: "Thus, it becomes apparent that if plaintiff succeeds on behalf of the dass, there will be a substantial recovery to
be distributed." 81
Turning to the problems associated with the necessity of giving
notice to the class members,82 Judge Tyler interpreted Rule 23(c)(2)
as an expression of the requirements of due process as perceived by
the Advisory Committee. He interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.83 as requiring
a flexible test designed to ensure adequate representation and protection for those persons not present but bound by the judgment.
Judge Tyler reasoned:
Consequently, where a class consists of a large number of claimants
with relatively small individual claims, notice to individual cl,ass
members, as a legal and practical matter, becomes less important
and need not be unduly emphasized or required. 84

He ordered a comprehensive scheme of notice, which did not however require individual notification for each identifiable class member.86 Despite the wording of Rule 23(c)(2) 86 and the arguments
made by the defendants that any mailed notice must go to all of
the approximately two million identifiable class members, the court
thought it necessary to recognize that stringent notice requirements
could "vitiate the class action device in situations where application
thereof as a matter of public policy can be important, such as -private antitrust, consumer and environmental litigation." 87 The court
concluded that the suit was a proper class _ac~ion under Rule 23. 88
Since the plaintiff had indicated that he would be unable to under79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
8788.

52 F.R.D. at 264-65. See text accompanying notes 172-73 infra.
52 F.R.D. at 264-65.
52 F.R.D. at 265.
See text accompanying notes 115-23 infra.
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
52 F.R.D. at 266.
52 F.R.D. at 267-68. See text _accompanying nqtes 118-23 infra.
See note 2_ supra.
52 F~D. at 266. ·. _
52 F.R.D. at 272,
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take the cost of providing notice, the court ordered a preliminary
hearing on the merits, after which it would determine if the defendants might properly be ordered to advance the cost. Although the
court recognized that as a practical matter the initial allocation of
the notice costs might determine whether the suit would indeed be
brought, it regarded this issue as separate from that of the propriety
and manageability of the class action under the federal rule. 80
In the second case, City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co.,00
a federal court in New Jersey considered certification of four overlapping class actions brought to recover damages allegedly incurred
because of violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by eight major
oil companies. The defendants had been indicted in 1965 under
section I of the Sherman Act for unlawfully conspiring and combining to fix and maintain tank wagon and retail gasoline prices
and for limiting the amount of gasoline available to private brand
distributors and retailers in the trading area of Delaware, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania between 1955 and 1965. Additional counts
charged four of the defendants with violations of section 2 of the
Sherman Act for unlawful combination and conspiracy to monopolize and attempt to monopolize. The defendants entered a plea
of nolo contendere on the eve of the criminal trial in 1969 after
three of the class actions had been filed. 01 The complaint in each class
action substantially tracked the indictment. 02
The State of New Jersey and the City of Philadelphia combined
to bring suit93 representing
all state and municipal governments, governmental agencies, authori-

ties, commissions and subdivisions and all other ultimate consumers situated throughout the States of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and
Delaware which have purchased, directly or indirectly, for use and
not for resale, 94
gasoline from the defendants between 1955 and 1965. The second
consumer class action95 was brought by McCloskey and Company,
a large construction corporation, seeking to represent all individuals,
corporations and other entities (but excluding governmental units)
89. 52 F.R.D. at 272.
90. 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
91. See 53 F.R.D. at 47-49.
92. 53 F.R.D. at 49.
93. Although the actions had been commenced independently, the parties filed a
consolidated and amended complaint prior to trial. 53 F.R.D. at 48.
94. 53 F.R.D. at 48.
95. The court refers to the three class suits as "consumer class actions" throughout
the opinion. The focus of this Comment is primarily on the subclass of the Philadelphia-New Jersey class comprised of consumer motorists who purchased gasoline at re•
tail prices. See text accompanying notes 109-11 infra.
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situated in the trading area that had purchased gasoline from the
defendants in tank wagon quantities or at tank wagon prices for
their own consumption. The court estimated that this class had
approximately 10,000 members. 96 The final consumer class action
was brought by the Yellow Cab Company, seeking to represent "all
individuals, partnerships, corporations and other entities engaged
in the business of furnishing taxicab, limousine and related services,"97 but excluding governmental units. This class contained
over 500 members, but Yellow Cab accounted for almost one quarter
of the taxicabs operating in the three-state area. 98 Potential overlap
among the classes was solved by agreements among the plaintiffs.99
The defendants argued that common questions did not predominate over individual questions as required by subsection (b)(3)
and that the plaintiffs could not overcome the manageability difficulties that would arise in the class actions because of the complexity
of the gasoline pricing structure.100 As to the Philadelphia-New
Jersey class, the defendants also challenged the adequacy of representation and the additional requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) that the
plaintiffs' claims be typical of the claims of the class.101 By applying
the Eisen test of adequacy of representation102 and by separating the
issue of the conspiracy from the issues of individual damages, the
court found that all the classes satisfied the requirements of Rule
23(a).103 The court concluded that the Philadelphia-New Jersey
plaintiffs did have claims typical of the class they purported to represent because "proof needed to demonstrate [the conspiracy] will be
the same irrespective of whether one purchased in five hundred
gallon quantities or from retail service stations."104
Recognizing the significance of the Eisen decision, which had
established expansive parameters for Rule 23(b)(3) by certifying a
class of six million persons, the court sought to distinguish City of
Philadelphia because of the complexity of the gasoline pricing
structure, and particularly because of the absence of an average
transaction or price differential. The court also noted that it did
not have a structural analysis of the industry prepared by independent parties, which had been present in the Eisen case in the form
96. 53 F.R.D. at 70.
97. 53 F.R.D. at 49.
98. 53 F.R.D. at 49, 70.
99. 53 F.R.D. at 48-49, 53.
100. 53 F.R.D. at 59-61. For a general discussion of the gasoline pricing structure,
see 53 F.R.D. at 58-59.
101. 53 F.R.D. at 60.
102. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
103. 53 F.R.D. at 68.
104. 53 F.R.D. at 68.
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of SEC-sponsored studies.105 The court also distinguished the prece•
dent provided by various antibiotic drug cases,100 stating that those
cases rest upon the
belief that a total damage award could be established for the entire
class. Such a total damage figure against which damages may be
claimed by individuals would be much more difficult to achieve in
the consumer actions pending in this Court. Even if such a figure
could be ascertained, significant problems would remain. Unlike
the antibiotic price structure, the gasoline price structure was much
less stable and more complex because of the various methods of sale,
thus creating problems for awarding individual damages.107
Despite this complicating factor, the court certified the McCloskey
and Yellow Cab classes, relying heavily on the business records that
members of these classes presumably had maintained and that would
provide a basis for calculation of individual damages.
The court divided the Philadelphia-New Jersey class into three
subclasses in order to assess the manageability problems.108 The
court certified the subclass of governmental agencies and authorities,
relying again on the records of quantity, quality, and price of gasoline that the class members had kept. As to the nongovernmental
components of the Philadelphia-New Jersey class, the court divided
the class into tank wagon purchasers and retail purchasers. The
court recognized that the tank wagon subclass corresponded precisely
with the McCloskey class, which it had certified. But as to the nongovernmental purchasers who had purchased at retail-namely,
motorists who had purchased gasoline at pump prices-the court
found that "the problems inherent in administering damage claims,
if liability and a general level of damages are established, are staggering."100
Although recognizing that individual motorists had purchased
more gasoline than all other ultimate users combined, the court
felt constrained to find this class unmanageable, and therefore rejected certification of the class action.110 The court felt that, unlike
the McCloskey, Yellow Cab, and governmental classes, individual
consumers would not have the necessary records of purchase to allow
a calculation of individual damages. Since many purchases had been
made in cash and the defendants did not possess the credit card
statements of charged purchases for the relevant period, the court
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

53 F.R.D. at 63-64.
See text accompanying notes 189-210 infra.
53 F.R.D. at 65.
53 F.R.D. at 70-71.
53 F.R.D. at 71.
53 F.R.D. at 72-73.
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concluded that a distribution of damages to the class would be
impossible regardless of a finding of the total damages incurred by
the class. Furthermore, the court rejected the notion of a fluid class
recovery that had been considered in the Eisen case:
Such a solution to the problems of awarding damages to individual
claimants is not realistically available for the group here under
consideration. The motorist who purchased gasoline from a retail
station during the relevant period is still likely, if he has not moved
out of the trading area, to continue his purchases of gasoline. However, he will be joined by many persons who were either not old
enough to have had a driver's license or were not residing in the
trading area between 1955 and 1965. Any fluid class recovery would
be a windfall to them and a deprivation to the motorist entitled to
recovery. This Court, believing that the composition of the motoring
public which purchased from retail stations has changed considerably during and since the alleged conspiracy ended, concludes that
there can not be a fluid class recovery for this group of the Philadelphia-New Jersey class.111
The irony of the court's decision is plain. The class actions sought
on behalf of large volume purchasers, such as governmental agencies
and business entities-for whom gasoline is a significant component
of their costs and for whom an individual suit is likely to be financially feasible-are permitted. But a class action, seeking to represent the "smaller guy," for whom no alternative means of recovery
are feasible, is not permitted, despite the express realization that
"the bulk of the ill-gotten gains reaped by defendants through their
assumed conspiracy will remain untouched within their corporate
coffers. " 112
Eisen and City of Philadelphia provide a framework around
which to analyze two of the most significant manageability problems-the notice that must be given to absent class members when
a Rule 23(b)(3) class action is proposed and the procedures that will
facilitate the calculation and distribution of damages to members
of the class without overwhelming court time and resources.

III.

MANAGEABILITY OF NoTICE UNDER

RuLE 23(c)(2)

Class actions brought under the amended federal rule are intended to determine the rights of all persons, present or absent,
whom the court finds to be members of the class. 113 In Hansberry v.
Lee,114 the Supreme Court held that class actions must fairly ensure
the protection of the interests of absent parties in order to comply
111.
112.
113.
114.

53 F.R.D. at 72.
53 F.R.D. at 73.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)-(3), set out in note 2 supra.
311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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with due process. Only when absent members of the class are adequately represented will the judgment be given res judicata effect.
Under the new rule the problem of absent parties will be most
prominent in subsection (b)(3) actions, in which a class representative is likely to commence suit without consultation with other
class members. Rule 23 therefore provides that absent members
may exclude themselves from the class or enter an appearance
through counsel. These members are to be given notice of any
action and of the options available to them. Specifically, the rule
provides:
[Rule 23 (c)(2)] In any class action maintained under subdivision
(b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through
his counsel.115
It was with this requirement in mind that the Second Circuit in
remanding the Eisen case cautioned that an evidentiary finding
that many members of the Eisen class could be identified with reasonable effort, and a subsequent failure of the plaintiff to furnish
individual notice to those class members, might well require dismissal of the class suit.m The requirement of individual notice
also contributed to the decision in City of Philadelphia to deny
certification of the class action because of the problems that would
arise in attempting to give notice to the members of the Philadelphia-New Jersey subclass. 117
In Eisen Judge Tyler subsequently found that two million members of the class were identifiable,11 8 and the defendants argued that
individual notice should be given to each of these members. Although noting that the argument was not without merit, Judge Tyler
rejected it because "such notice is not compelled by the standards
of due process and Rule 23(c)(2) in the context of this case."119
Instead, he proposed a three-stage notice plan: (1) individual notice
ll5. FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(c)(2) (emphasis added).
ll6. 391 F.2d at 570. The plaintiff had asserted from the outset that he would not
be able to pay for the forms and methods of notice ordered by the court, 52 F.R.D, at
269.
117. 53 F.R.D. at 71.
118. He found that the remaining 4 million members could not be identified "with
reasonable effort." 52 F.R.D.. at 257.
119. 52 F.R.D. at 267.
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would be given to each of the member firms of the New York Stock
Exchange and to all commercial banks with large trust departments
in an attempt to provide many class members with indirect but
nevertheless effective notice; 120 (2) individual notice would be sent
to the 2,000 identifiable members of the class who had conducted
ten or more odd-lot transactions during the relevant period,121 and
to 5,000 additional class members selected at random; 122 and (3)
notice by publication would be provided in the Wall Street Journal
and in the New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco
Examiner, and Los Angeles Times since New York and California
had the largest number of shareholders of all states involved. 123
The precise conflict that Eisen raised, namely, the balancing of
the notice required by Rule 23(c)(2) with the policy consideration
that "expensive and stringent notice requirements could vitiate the
class action device in situations where application thereof as a matter
of public policy can be important," 124 has been anticipated by a
number of commentators.125 To a substantial degree, Judge Tyler's
attitude toward the policy behind the notice requirement of Rule
23(c)(2) and his specific plan for providing notice reflect the prevailing consensus of the commentators. 126 Central to this position is
the finding that Rule 23 was an attempt by the Advisory Committee
to embody the requirements of due process in the class action rule
and that "Rule 23(c)(2) does not add to these requirements; it
simply formulates guidelines for a particular kind of notice in a
particular kind of action." 127 The Advisory Committee was avowedly
attempting to incorporate in subsection (c)(2) the due process requirements that the Supreme Court had set forth in Hansberry and
120. 52 F.R.D. at 267.
121. 52 F.R.D. at 267. The district court hoped thereby to comply with the suggestion of the court of appeals that notice should be given to those persons who "may
possess enough of a stake in the proceedings to justify personal intervention." 391 F.2d
at 569.
122. 52 F.R.D. at 267. Notice to members selected at random is designed to assure
that any significant subclass that might challenge the adequacy of the plaintiff's
representation would come to the attention of the court. Expressions of displeasure
would cause the court to re-examine the adequacy of representation. 391 F.2d at 563.
123. 52 F.R.D. at 268. See also Appendix A, Geographic Distribution of Shareowners
of Public Corporations, 52 F.R.D. at 273.
124. 52 F.R.D. at 266.
125. Homburger, supra note 53; at 637-47; Comment, Adequate Representation,
Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 889, 905-19 (1968); Note, Class Actions Under Federal
Rule 2!J(bX!J)-The Notice Requirement, 29 Mo. L. R.Ev. 139 (1969); Note, Federal
Rule 2!J(c)(2)-Notice in Class Actions-Mullane Reconsidered, 43 TULANE L. REv. 369
(1969).
126. See, e.g., the ~orms of notice suggested in Comment, supra note 125, at 918.
127. 52 F.R.D. at 266.
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Mullane. 128 Some commentators have argued that since the Advisory
Committee had this limited purpose in drafting subsection (c)(2),
a showing that it had mistakenly interpreted the Hansberry and
Mullane mandates would be sufficient to permit a judicial end run
around the individual notice requirement as long as a court complied with the "correct" notions of due process. 120 To that end,
Hansberry has been interpreted as requiring an adequacy of representation that may be assured by means short of individual notice
to all identifiable class members, 130 and Mullane has been interpreted
as requiring a balancing of interests between the form of reasonable
notice required and the "practicalities and peculiarities" of the
litigation context.131 Other commentators have even suggested that
the Committee's interpretation of Hansberry and Mullane was not
only faulty, but also unnecessary since the concept of due process
in representative actions may not require any notice when there is
a direct and compelling state interest or a basis for presuming consent of class members.132 Those calling for a circumvention of the
literal impact of the individual notice requirement have sought to
explain the flexible application of the notice mandate by focusing on
the "reasonable effort" or "best notice practicable under the circumstances" as authorization for the use of judicial discretion. 188
This approach to Rule 23(c)(2) would be significantly undermined, however, by any showing that the Advisory Committee intentionally embodied within the notice requirement a more stringent
standard than that compelled by due process. The Preliminary Draft
of the Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure,184 published in
1964, contained the following notice provision under subsection
(c)(2):
To afford members of the class an opportunity to request exclusion,
the court shall direct that reasonable notice be given to the class, including specific notice to each member known to be engaged in a
separate suit on the same subject matter ·with the party opposed to
the class.135
128. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 107.
129. E.g., Note, 29 MD. L. REv. 139, supra note 125, at 153•54.
130. E.g., Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 232-37; Note, 29 MD. L. REv. 139, supra note
125, at 142-43.
131. E.g., Comment, supra note 125, at 911-15; Note, 29 MD. L. R.Ev. 139, supra note
125, at 143-50.
132. Maraist 8: Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process and the
Class Action, 49 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1 (1970).
133. E.g., Note, 29 MD. L. REv. 139, supra note 125, at 151-54. Contra, Note, Class
Actions Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years of Judicial Interpretation, 49 B.U. L.
REv. 682, 704 (1969).
134. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 325 (1964) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
135. Id. at 386.
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Although this subsection was substantially altered before adoption
in 1966, the Advisory Committee Note to that provision, in which the
drafters expressed their belief that they had fulfilled the demands of
due process, remained virtually unaltered between the 1964 and 1966
versions. 136 In other words, the Committee felt that the 1964 notice
provision already satisfied the due process requirements of Hansberry
and Mullane. The Committee's decision to propose more onerous
notice standards must have reflected either a revised notion of the
due process requirements or an intention to promote another policy
objective.
The Advisory Committee recognized that the proposed amendment
of Rule 23 was a substantial deviation from the former rule, most
notably in the provision that all members of the class would be included in the judgment; 137 previously the extent of the judgment was
determined by the nature of the rights adjudicated. Acknowledging the innovations contained in the Preliminary Draft, the Committee specifically solicited comments from the bench and the bar
regarding subsections (b)(3) and (c)(2). 138 The response was not overwhelmingly positive,189 and much of the criticism revolved around the
binding effect that the Committee intended would be given to
judgments affecting absent persons who had taken no affirmative
action either to be included or excluded from the class or who had
received no notice that a suit was being brought in their behalf.140
Since the incomplete and inconsistent application of res judicata
effects under the provisions of the former rule had been a principal
source of its difficulty,141 the Committee may well have been unwilling to abandon this aspect of the rule revision. It did recognize that
the objection to giving binding effect to class actions based merely on
common questions under Rule 23(b)(3) could be partially mitigated
by a strong notice provision that would increase the opportunity for
unwilling persons to exclude themselves from the class. 142 If, indeed,
this was the reason for the alteration of the notice provision between
1964 and 1966, and that provision was not merely a reassessment of
the Committee's concept of due process, then the requirement that
136. Compare Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 106-07, with Preliminary Draft, supra
note 134, at 394-95.
137. See text accompanying notes 113-15 supra.
138. Preliminary Draft, supra note 134, at 395.
139. E.g., COMMrIT.EE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-JUDICIAL CONFERENCENINTH CIRCUIT, REPORT, 36 F.R.D. 209, 222-26 (1964); id., SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, 37
F.R.D. 71, 71-72, 76-77, 79-85 (1965); id., SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, 37 F.R.D. 499,
500, 520-23 (1965).
140. See Frankel, supra note 3, at 299-300; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L.
REv. 356, 397 (1967).
141. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 98-99; Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 250-58.
142. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, .•upra note 139, at 81-82.
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individual notice be given to identifiable members cannot be dismissed as an error of interpretation. Instead, it must be regarded
as a mechanism intended to allow potential class members a meaningful opportunity to withdraw from the class. As such, its literal
application cannot be avoided by a finding that its terms are more
stringent than minimal compliance with due process would otherwise
dictate.
On balance, the approach offered by Judge Tyler is a more responsive interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2) and may well be a more
accurate interpretation of the intended operation and scope of the
notice provision. The deficiency of the "trade-off" analysis is that it
amounts to little more than speculation. More importantly, it runs
counter to at least one expression of the purpose of the amended
rule. Consider in this regard the personal reflections on the notice
provision by Professor Benjamin Kaplan, the Reporter to the Advisory Committee:
Again, the critics undervalued the (c)(2) notice, even when considered apart from the discretionary notice possibilities of subdivision (d). In particular cases it may be practical to give notice
under (c)(2) which will reach each member of the class. That will
not be possible in all cases, but when large numbers of people are
dealt with, perfect notice, while on the one hand hard to attain becomes on the other hand unnecessary because of the probability that
some individuals who are representative of differing opinions within
the group (if such differences exist) will in fact be reached and will
speak up. Notice which is fair in the circumstances of the case is a
constitutional requirement. We can therefore expect courts to work
toward providing the best practicable notice, as indeed (c)(2) in terms
requires.14s

The approach taken by Judge Tyler in arriving at his three-stage
notice provision in Eisen mirrors Professor Kaplan's interpretation
of the purpose of Rule 23(c)(2).144 Furthermore, vesting the judge
with discretion to mold the parameters of the class action is perhaps
the most significant general feature of the amended rule146 and is consistent with the approach taken in Eisen.
· Providing notice to the members of a large class, even under a
liberal interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2), can be a costly proposition.
143. Kaplan, supra note 140, at 396.
144. 52 F.R.D. at 267-68, citing Kaplan, supra note 140.
145. See the dissent of Justice Black to the adoption of the amended rule at 883 U.S.
1031, 1035 (1966):
I particularly think that every member of the Court should examine with great
care the amendments relating to class suits. It seems to me that they place too much
power in the hands of the trial judges and that the rules might almost as well
simply,provide µiat "class suits can be maintained either for or against particular
groups whenever in the discretion of a judge he thinks it is wise."
See also Z. CHAn:E, supra note 5,.at 288-95; Frankel, s.upra note 2, at 801, ,
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It is not surprising then that courts have already been presented
with the issue of the allocation of the expenses of providing notice.
In Eisen, the district court recognized that as a practical matter
the allocation of expenses might determine whether the plaintiff
could proceed with the action.146 Although the court of appeals assumed that the plaintiff would have to bear the costs of notice,147
the district court felt that the issue was not conclusively determined
for the circuit148 and ordered a preliminary hearing on the merits
after which it would decide if the defendants might properly be
required to advance the costs of providing notice. In City of Philadelphia, counsel for the Philadelphia-New Jersey class agreed to pay
the costs of notice, and the court found it unnecessary to analyze
the problems of notice in depth because other factors were dispositive
of the case.140 It is important to recognize, however, that the practical
effect of the allocation of costs on the ability of the plaintiff to bring
suit is not the only context in which the scope and costs of notice
are relevant. The ultimate costs of notice will be deducted from
any recovery the class might receive before any funds are distributed
to class members. 150 To the extent that the costs of notice are substantial because of the wide scope of notice ordered, it may reduce
the likelihood that significant funds will remain after the costs of
litigation are paid151 and influence a court to refuse certification of
a class. In Eisen, for example, the court determined that the cost
of providing notice through its three-stage plan would amount to
approximately $21,720; 152 and if it had ordered individual notice
to the 2 million identifiable members of the class the cost would have
exceeded $200,000.163 Since the court estimated that even a minimal
recovery from the defendants would approximate 22 million dollars
when trebled, 164 the impact of a wider scope of notice would not
146. 52 F.R.D. at 269-70.
147. 391 F.2d at 568.
148. "Indeed, despite the apparently unequivocal language in Eisen II .•• the Court
of Appeals for this circuit has indicated in a subsequent opinion that the question is
still an open one. Green v. Wolfe Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 n.15 (2d Cir. 1968)." 52
F.R.D. at 269.
149. 53 F.R.D. at 57.
150. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 725, 731, 747 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3166 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971),
discussed in text following note 188 infra.
151. Just liow notice can be worded which could alert so large a "class" to the
possibility that proceedings in the Southern District, if carried fonvard, would
someday enrich each by a few dollars, if there be anything left after expenses and
attorneys' fees, is a mystery to me.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
152. 52 F.R.D. at 267-68 (individual notice: $1,000; notice by publication: $20,720).
153. 52 F.R.D. at 260.
154. 52 F.R.D. at 265. Because tile odd-lot differential had been lowered by 5 million
dollars per year as of 1966, the court was able to estimate a reasonable range of re~ver-
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have been determinative. But it is not difficult to envision a case in
which a court would refuse certification on the ground that the
costs of litigation threatened to exceed any damage award that the
court could foresee at that stage of the litigation. Even when the
plaintiff is able to provide the notice ordered or the court determines
through a preliminary hearing that the defendant ought to advance
the costs of providing notice, courts should be reluctant to prescribe
extensive notice that will only reduce the ultimate recovery. The
various constraints on the operation of class actions that arise from a
literal application of Rule 23(c)(2) are likely to be avoided through
court-ordered notice that is more consonant with the policy and
intention embodied in the amended federal rule.
IV.

MANAGEABILITY OF CALCULATION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGES

To the extent that the class action mechanism is designed to induce individuals to litigate small but valid claims-and there can be
no doubt that this is a major goal of the class action-the primary
focus on manageability must eventually be directed to the desired
end result: the actual recovery of losses by individual members of
the class. If, after months or years of litigation, volumes of testimony,
and thousands of court hours, the prospects of distribution of damages to class members are dim because of the impossibility of proof
of damages or insurmountable administrative burdens and costs,
then the class action mechanism is inadequate for its designed purpose. Indeed, the courts have generally recognized the importance
of determining that eventual distribution is possible (assuming that
liability can be established) before undertaking full-scale proceedings. This factor was recognized in both the Eisen166 and City of
Philadelphia166 decisions.
An analysis of the distribution process currently utilized to administer damages in class actions reveals serious limitations, which
challenge the ability of the courts to fashion a manageable remedy.
These limitations will be examined, as will a possible alternative to
able damages with which to compare the anticipated costs of litigation. Generally, such
data are not likely to be available to courts at this stage of the litigation. This will
lead courts to make conservative estimates of recoverable damages, thus increasing the
impact that a wide scope of notice will have on the decision of the court to grant or
refuse certification of the class.
155. "Bearing in mind the desirability of providing small claimants with a forum in
which to seek redress for alleged large scale anti-trust violations, we are still reluctant
to permit actions to proceed where they are not likely to benefit anyone but the lawyers who bring them." 391 F.2d at 567.
156. "It is readily apparent that no matter how easy it is to establish damages on a
class level, if it is extremely difficult or almost impossible to distribute these sums to
their rightful recipients, the class is unmanageable." 53 F.R.D. at 72.
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the current damage distribution procedure-the fluid class recovery.
The proposed alternative compensates for the shortcomings of the
present distribution mechanism and has the potential of relieving
the court of any active role in this distribution process, while at the
same time assuring the rights of the defendant and the vitality of the
class action rule.
A. Present Distribution Procedure
The procedure by which damages are presently calculated, proved,
and distributed in class actions does not differ significantly from the
process by which damages are ordinarily handled in the nonclass
action context. Upon a finding of liability, the court may direct under
Rule 23(d) 167 that class members be informed that liability has been
established and that damage claims may be submitted. The court
may additionally provide a claim form to facilitate a uniform system
of claim verification. When the defendant has detailed records from
which damages may be calculated, no appearance by individual members of the class need be required. When defendants' records are not
complete, members' claims may be submitted to a committee of
counsel for a determination of those claims that are acceptable to
both sides, with challenges decided by the court.158 Once the total
amount of provable damages is established, pro rata deductions for
litigation expenses such as notice and attorneys' fees may be made,
with the remainder distributed to the individual class members.159
This method of damage calculation and administration has serious limitations that result from its failure to accept and accommodate
the differences between ordinary party litigation and the class action.
As noted in City of Philadelphia, it is the difficulty of administering
the damage distribution process that poses a serious threat-and
in the case of the Philadelphia-New Jersey nongovernmental subclass,
the fatal blow-to effective utilization of the class action mechanism.100
One limitation of the present system, which may only be temporary, arises from the fact that individual consumers are not likely
to retain the records necessary to prove actual damages in the sense
ordinarily contemplated in the litigation context. Since the damages
per individual are small in consumer class actions,161 the consumers
are unlikely to retain records, as they might in large dollar transactions or as a business retains records for financial reporting pur157. See note 2 supra.
158. See 53 F.R.D. at 72.
159. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards,
69 HARV. L, REV. 658 (1956).
160. 53 F.R.D. at 73-74.
161. Kalven &: Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 684-86.
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poses. While the "logical alternative is to use the defendants' records,
such records may not be available in cases when the alleged illegal
transaction transpired years before the litigation. For example, in
City of Philadelphia, the alleged antitrust violations occurred between 1955 and 1965; records going back fifteen years, in some
instances, would be required to substantiate those damage claims.162
The situation is further exacerbated by the complexity of class action
suits, which may result in years 0£ litigation before liability is established and attention is finally directed to proof of damages.168 It is
likely that as the parameters of the class action rule are gradually
established class action litigation will be expedited. But at least in
the short run the inherent time lag between the illegal transactions
and the stage of litigation when damage proof is to be submitted
decreases the probability that consumers will be able to satisfy the
traditional standards of damage proof.
A more substantial limitation on the present procedure results
from the use of a committee of counsel to determine damage claims
acceptable to both parties.164 This process is premised on the good
faith efforts of the parties to minimize the active role of the court
in determining individual claims. At the same time, the defendant
must be assured of due process in the determination of damages and
may therefore invoke the traditional procedural devices available to
him. Thus, the defendant may seek transactional data from all class
members, requests to admit, depositions, and admissions.166 In the
separate trial that may be ordered to determine damages,100 the defendant presumably can seek jury determination of asserted damage
claims.167 This combination of procedural tactics, many of which are
legitimate means of protecting the defendant's property rights, nevertheless increases the costs and effort of litigation to each class member.
Even after a determination of liability, the class member may regard
the costs and effort of providing proof as exceeding the value derived
from even full recovery of his claim, especially when his individual
claim is small.
Perhaps the most serious limitation presented by the traditional
damage proof and distribution process is that it directly contradicts
162. Proof of damages might have been eased had credit card statements been available. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants, however, maintained such statements. 53 F.R.D.
at 72.
163. It took five years of litigation before the class action in Eisen was certified.
See note 56 supra.
164. See City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 71 (D.N.J. 1971).
165. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovation in Antitrust
Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REv. I, 7 (1971).
166. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
167. Cf. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541 (1970). The rationale of the Court in
allowing a jury trial in a stockholders' derivative suit seems applicable to class actions.
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the policy adopted by the Advisory Committee in the amended rule,
which provides that all members of the class will be included in the
judgment unless they take affirmative action to be excluded from the
class. 168 This deliberate decision to require persons to opt out of the
class, instead of requiring affirmative action for inclusion in the
class, was designed to advance the broad application of Rule 23(b)(3)
actions. Although applied to the initial formation of the class, the
theory of automatic inclusion is equally appropriate at the damage
stage:
If, now we consider the class, rather than the party opposed, we see

that requiring the individuals affirmatively to request inclusion in
the lawsuit would result in freezing out the claims of people--especially small claims held by small people-who for one reason or
another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business or legal
matters, will simply not take the affirmative step. 1 69
Admittedly, class members will probably be less hesitant to file
damage claims than they would have been to have affirmatively joined
the class in the first place, but timidity and unfamiliarity are likely to
continue to discourage filing by significant numbers of class members.
Nonetheless, in City of Philadelphia, the court expressly held that affidavits would not be sufficient, and that individual motorists would
have to resort to additional means of proof such as itemized deductions on income tax returns to prove gasoline purchases. 170 In
Eisen, the court recognized that individual investors would have to
reconstruct their odd-lot transactions during the years in question,
with the assistance of their stockbrokers if necessary. 171 The burden
of complying with these standards of proof, as well as the inherent
limiting factors of requiring affirmative action, combine to pose a
serious threat to the prospects of assuring effective adjudication
through class actions under the traditional procedure of damage
calculation. This has led courts to seek alternative methods of calculation that alleviate the necessity of proving individual damages.
One such possibility is the fluid class recovery.

B. The Fluid Class Recovery
In considering the mechanics of the distribution of recovery in
Eisen, Judge Tyler discussed the fluid class recovery as an alternative
to personal and individual recoupment of damages. 172 Under this
168. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c) (3), set out in note 2 supra.
169. Kaplan, supra note 140, at 397-98.
170. 53 F.R.D. at 72-73.
171. 52 F.R.D. at 263-64.
172. Judge Tyler noted that this form of recovery had been suggested by the plaintiff, who had been represented in the early stages of the litigation by Pomerantz, Levy,
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distribution theory damages would be distributed to the class as a
whole, rather than directly to individuals. While individuals would
be permitted to recover damages they could prove, the unclaimed
remainder of gross damages would be recovered from the defendants
by reducing the odd-lot differential charged in subsequent transactions until such time as the balance of the damages is returned to the
class. A fluid class recovery would assure that the actual damages
suffered would be returned to the class, albeit in a less direct manner
than if all the members of the class had filed individual claims.
A distribution system based on the concept of a fluid class recovery
would largely alleviate the limitations in existing distribution formulas. Upon a determination of liability, the court would simply
undertake to establish gross damages, i.e., the aggregate damages
suffered by the class as an entity. Of course, such a determination may
not always be possible, particularly in industries in which constantly
varying markups and costs make an assessment of damages on a perunit or average-transaction basis impossible. In the Eisen case, the
court expressly found that gross damages could be calculated because
the odd-lot differential was a recurring, standard charge that could
be analyzed to yield the average illegal margin charged.173 At this
stage of the litigation process the defendant would be permitted to
contest the computation of damages by offering proof of varying
margins or by demonstrating that the illegal margin was not charged
in all transactions. 174 In City of Philadelphia, the defendants in fact
did offer evidence of the complexity of the gasoline pricing structure,
which might have precluded any determination of gross damages. 171l
By this process, the defendant would have ample opportunity to defend his property by countering the plaintiff's allegations and proof of
damages.
Once gross damages are determined, the court would in essence
establish a damage fund. The subsequent steps in distributing the
fund would be similar to distribution systems used in class actions
that are settled out of court176 with judicial approval under Rule
23(e). Deductions would be made from the fund to cover litigation
expenses, with the remainder available for distribution to the class.
Haudek & Block of New York City. See 370 F.2d at 119; 391 F.2d at 559. Abraham
Pomerantz, an active advocate of the class action, suggested the gradual recoupmcnt of
damages through a reduction in the odd-lot differential in New Developments ill Class
Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAw. 1259, 1260-65 (1970),
under the heading "The 'Cy Pres' Doctrine in the Class Action." See text accompany•
ing note 1 supra; Pomerantz &: Haudek, Class Actions, 2 REVIEW OF SECURITIES REGULA•
TION 937 (1969).
173.
174.
175.
176.

52 F.R.D. at 257.
But see Handler, supra note 165, at 6-7.
53 F.R.D. at 58.
See generally Dole, supra note 41.
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Those members of the class who have retained their transactional
records and could satisfy the traditional standards of proof would be
invited to file claims that would be examined through a committee of
counsel or a random verification process.177 Since the amount of damages for which the defendant is liable is fixed by the determination
of gross damages, the defendant has little incentive to thwart efforts
at claim verification or to discourage the filing of claims by dilatory
tactics. The fluid class recovery thus allows those persons who actively
assert their rights and prove their claims to be awarded damages in
direct relation to the proof that they offer.178 At the same time, the
distribution procedure complements the policy of the Advisory Committee179 by offering a general recovery even to those class members
who have not taken affirmative action by filing claims.

I. Precedent for the Fluid Class Recovery
Judge Tyler stated in Eisen that there is "respectable precedent"
for the fluid class recovery. 180 The cases cited by Judge Tyler not
only presage the advent of the fluid class recovery; more importantly,
they provide an insight into the ultimate question whether fluid class
recovery solves the manageability problems of class actions.
In Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission, 181 the plaintiff challenged an order by the Public Utilities Commission of the District
of Columbia authorizing an increase in the fare charged Transit
users. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that
the Commission had made errors in calculating net operating income,
which resulted in an understating of the rate of return earned by
Transit operations. The court concluded that the fare increase,
amounting to a nickel on individual token purchases, should not
have been granted. Although the plaintiff had sued in his own
behalf and not as a representative of the class of Transit users, the
court prescribed a broad remedy: "It is not feasible to require refunds to be made to individuals who paid the increase. Nevertheless,
the amount realized by Transit from the increase must be utilized
for the benefit of the class who paid it, that is, those who use the
Transit."182 To that end, the court ordered the Transit to establish
a fund in the amount of the illegal overcharge to be used for the
purpose of benefiting Transit users in any rate proceedings pending
or thereafter instituted. Recognizing that the actual amount charged
or collected might not be available in cash, the court permitted the
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 71 (D.N.J. 1971).
See generally Kaplan, supra note 140, at 397.
See text accompanying notes 168-69 supra.
52 F.R.D. at 264.
318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
318 F.2d at 203.
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establishment of a reserve or special account on the books of the
Transit. The utilization and disposition of the fund was left to the
discretion of the Commission with regulatory authority over the
Transit.
In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 183 the plaintiff sought to bring a class
action against a cab company, alleging that the company had set its
taxicab meters to charge rates in excess of those authorized by the
Public Utilities Commission of the City of Los Angeles. In separate
counts, the plaintiff offered to represent two subclasses of taxicab
passengers: those who had paid fares in script, known to the defendants because of records kept of script sales, and those who had
paid taxicab fares in cash. The superior court sustained a demurrer
by the defendant and transferred the case to the municipal court after
determining that the plaintiff could not maintain a class action and
therefore could not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements to bring
suit in the superior court. In reversing the superior court, the
California supreme court referred to the issue of damage calculation and distribution at numerous points in its opinion. The
court, taking the plaintiff's allegations of fact as true, found that
the defendant could compute the amount of the overcharges from
records in its possession and that it would therefore not be necessary
for individual members of the class to make personal appearances
to recover the full amount of the overcharges.184 In a footnote,186 the
court discussed a suggestion made by the State of California as amicus
curiae that the total amount of overcharges should be deposited with
the superior court or an acceptable trustee and damages distributed
to those who could identify themselves as class members. At the end
of seven years, the funds would be presumed abandoned in accordance
with California law. The court declined to rule on the merits of
this proposal because it felt that such matters should be determined
by the trial court.186
183. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P .2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
184. 67 Cal. 2d 716, 433 P.2d at 747, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
185. 67 Cal. 2d at 715 n.15, 433 P .2d at 746 n.15, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738 n,15.
186. The parties settled out of court on October 19, 1970 for $1.4 million, of which
$950,000 was to be returned to the class by a reduction of taxicab fares below the then
existing maximum authorized fares. The defendants agreed to reduce fares in a mini•
mum amount of $95,000 annually until the total fare reduction was completed. The
remainder of the settlement was designated as attorneys' fees, Stipulation for Settlement
and Judgment on file with the Michigan Law Review.
The superior court held hearings on the fairness of the settlement, and judgment
was entered on May 3, 1971. The final settlement, entered as a judgment, differed in
several respects from the original settlement agreement and provided for $200,000 in
attorneys' fees. The Board of Public Utilities and Transportation of the City of Los
Angeles was charged with the duty of overseeing compliance with the judgment. The
plaintiff recommended this form of recovery because it was feared that the cost of
administering and supervising claims would consume a disproportionate amount of
the money recovered in judgment. Letter from Leon Perlsweig, an attorney for the
plaintiff, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
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Despite its suggestive language, Daar is uncertain authority for
any fluid class recovery. The California supreme court stated at two
points in the decision that individuals damaged by the overcharge
must ultimately prove separate claims. 187 In a subsequent case, that
court averred that Daar requires individual demonstration of damages.1ss
As support for the use of a fluid class recovery, the Eisen court
also cited the antibiotic drug cases. In West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co.,180 sixty-six civil suits alleging violation of the Sherman Act
were consolidated in one class action. 100 The defendant drug manufacturers offered a settlement of 100 million dollars, which was accepted by the majority of plaintiffs and submitted to the court for
approval under Rule 23(e).101 The plaintiffs proposed various distribution schemes, the most important of which was the "Alabama
Plan," which formed the basis for the plan later adopted by the
defendants. Under that distribution plan, 37 million dollars was
allocated for consumers, who were represented by governmental
entities.192 The court quoted approvingly from the "Alabama Plan":
After payments to individual consumers who have filed claims in
accordance with the Court's notice are deducted from each entity's
consumer fund, the balance, if any, should be held for distribution in
accordance with each entity's internal, or second-stage allocation
plan. Most entities joining in this allocation plan will seek court
approval in their second-stage allocation plans for an additional
period of time within which individual consumers may be permitted
to file claims. Others may seek court approval to use the balance of
their consumer fund for a public health purpose. The Court has
the power, and, of course, should exercise its equitable control over
these funds for the benefit of all consumers.193
The foundation for this second-stage plan had been laid in 1969
when notice by publication had been given to the consumer class
members informing them that a failure to file claims by August 16,
1969, would constitute authorization to whatever government official
was their representative to use the funds in a manner designed to
187. 67 Cal. 2d at 706,713,433 P.2d at 740, 745, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732, 737.
188. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Ca~. 3d 800, 815, 484 P .2d 964, 973, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796, 805 (1971).
.
.
189. 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a/fd., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3166 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971).
.
190. The actions were instituted by various governmental entities and representatives of wholesalers and retailers. 314 F. Supp. at 721-22.
191. See note 2 supra.
192. The balance of the fund was allocated primarily to governmental agencies to
compensate for institutional purchases (50 million dollars) and vendor reimbursement
programs (10 million dollars). 314 F. Supp. at 728.
:
.
193. 314 F. Supp. at 728.
.. l.. •
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benefit the citizens of the state.194 The propriety of allowing the
states to recover damages through their attorneys general on behalf
of individual consumers who had not filed claims was challenged on
appeal by dissatisfied members of the class.105 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision that approved
the settlement.106
The settlement procedure adopted in the drug cases is significant because the court had before it data from which it could reasonably predict the amount of damages that seemed destined to go
unclaimed by consumer members of the class. At the time the settlement was approved, after the deadline for filing claims, 38,000
customers had filed claims with an aggregate face amount of more
than 16½ million dollars. 197 Nevertheless, the court felt it within its
power to allocate over fifty per cent of the settlement fund to the
states in accordance with their intent to use the fluid class recovery
for some public health purpose.
Seven states refused to accept the defendant's offer to settle and
were excluded from the settlement agreement in Pfizer. Their causes
of action were assigned for completion of pretrial proceedings. 108 Although Judge Tyler did not consider these proceedings in his
analysis of the fluid class recovery in Eisen, 199 the proceedings were
examined in City of Philadelphia as additional precedent for the
fluid class recovery in large consumer class actions. 200
The seven states sought to represent two classes, governmental
entities that had purchased antibiotics for their own use or for institutional purposes201 and retail purchasers of drugs.202 As to this
latter consumer class, the court concluded that the requirements
of Rule 23(a) were satisfied and that the common issues predominated
over individual issues as required by Rule 23(b)(3).208 Although the
194. 314 F. Supp. at 724-25.
195. 440 F.2d at 1089. The appeal was taken by the wholesaler-retailer portion of

the class. Of the settlement offer, only 3 million dollars, which the court admitted was
an arbitrary "nuisance value allocation,'' was apportioned to this subclass. By passing
on the illegal overcharges to its customers, this subclass may not have suffered any
damages. See 314 F. Supp. at 728.
196. 440 F.2d at 1092.
197. 314 F. Supp. at 728.
198. In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation Involving
Antibiotic Drugs, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,398 ij.P.M.L. 1970).
199. Judge Tyler spoke of the "Drug Cases," but he apparently considered only
314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See 52 F.R.D. at 259.
200. 53 F.R.D. at 64-66.
201. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,481 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
202. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,482 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
203. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 73,482, at 89,960.
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court felt that a sufficient showing had been made "to warrant the
establishment of the proposed classes,"204 the order was conditioned
on a showing that the actions were manageable and that satisfactory
notice could be provided.205 On the issue of damage calculation, the
court tentatively concluded that the amount of damages suffered
by class members could be determined by estimating gross damages
instead of aggregating individual damage claims.206
In an opinion directed primarily to the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3)(D) and the manageability problems presented, the court
rejected the defendants' contention that an assessment of gross
damages would violate their rights to a jury trial and due process.207
Denying the defendants' claim that a class-wide recovery would result in a windfall to which the plaintiffs were not entitled, the court
stated:
If we assume that a price-fixing conspiracy is proven at trial, however, the defendants will certainly have no right to the "pot of gold"
created by their illegal activities. And the success of their scheme and
the size of the "pot" would certainly be no basis for leaving the
money in their hands. 20s
The court did have difficulty in deciding whether damages proved
through a calculation of total damages, but unclaimed by individual
members, should be given to the states for the benefit of the absent
class members. 209 The court concluded that Rule 23 does not require that the funds be given to the class representatives, although
it recognized that the alternative of returning unclaimed damages
to the defendants was unattractive. It deferred consideration of the
disposition of the residue until such time as the issue actually
arose. 210 Nevertheless, these pretrial orders are important steps in
the acceptance of the fluid class recovery because of the express
holding that calculation of damages by establishing the total damages suffered by the class as an entity preserves the due process
rights to which the defendants are entitled.
Taken together, the above cases do provide reasonable precedent
204. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,r 73,482, at 89,959.
205. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,J 73,482, at 89,962.
206. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,482, at 89,960-61.
207. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,699, at 90,914 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
208. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,699, at 90,913.
209. The court seemed concerned that awarding the residual to the states would
constitute tacit recognition of the parens patriae concept. The court had previously
denied the parens patriae claims raised by the states "without prejudice to renewal at
a later date in the evel!t of a decision by the Supreme Court ••. in Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970)." 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,699, at 90,913
n.6. Oral argument was heard in Standard Oil and is noted at 40 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S.
Oct. 26, 1971).
210. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,J 73,699, at 90,913-14.
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for the use of a fluid class recovery. Bebchick, Daar, and Eisen involved activities that are regulated by a commission. Both Bebchick
and Eisen recognize the supervisory authority that will be exercised
over the period of time necessary to deplete the damage fund. 211
When no such regulatory or enforcement body exists to police the
administration of the fluid class recovery, it is not clear that the
courts will be providing a more manageable solution of the distribution dilemma by employing a fluid class recovery.
The drug cases, while offering perhaps the strongest support for
the authority of a court to fashion a fluid class recovery, do not,
however, suggest a solution to the manageability problems that will
fall on a court that authorizes a fluid class recovery when no supervisory agency is present. In the drug cases, governmental entities
were the class representatives, and the residual was to be returned
to them to be used at their discretion for public health purposes. 212
It is difficult to imagine representatives who might be better able
to use the funds to benefit the class members. Governmental entities
are as well equipped as the Public Utilities Commissions or the SEC
to assure actual return of the fund balance to the consumer class.
Therefore, although the three cases cited by Judge Tyler do provide precedent for the use of the fluid class recovery in Eisen, none
of the cases suggests whether a court would authorize a fluid recovery
when the class representatives are individual consumers or purchasers and when the nature of the activity involved thrusts the
court into an active role policing the decree over the time needed
to deplete the fund.

2. Applicability of the Fluid Class Recovery
In discussing the applicability of the fluid class recovery, both
the Eisen and City of Philadelphia courts felt that such a recovery
was appropriate only in those situations in which, because of the
high decree of repetitive activity by the members of the class, the
court could be assured that the same persons who had incurred
damages wouTd receive the benefits of the distribution. In Eisen the
court believed that there was a sufficiently high level of repetitive
activity to ensure that the individuals injured in past odd-lot transactions would largely recoup their damages through future odd-lot
dealings with the defendants at lower differentials. 213 Conversely,
in City of Philadelphia the court was concerned about the windfall
that would accrue to the large number of new motorists who entered
the relevant market subsequent to the alleged illegal activity; it
211. 318 F.2d at 204; 52 F.R.D. at 265.
212. See text accompanying note 193 supra.
213. 52 F.R.D. at 265.
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concluded that the composition of the class of motorists had changed
sufficiently so as to rule out the application of a fluid class recovery.214
However, it is by no means certain that lack of repetitive
activity should limit the application of the fluid class recovery.
Focusing for the moment on the illegal conduct of the defendant,
it is clear that a remedy that requires a defendant to relinquish
the fruits of its illegal activity has a substantial in terrorem effect.215
When, because of the changing components of the market, a defendant is permitted to engage in illegal activity without the constraint
of a potential liability for the full amount of illegal gains, the temptation to engage in such activity is strongest. In the antitrust field,
the provision for recovery of treble damages216 and the frequent
judicial pronouncements of the valuable service that private enforcement of the antitrust laws provides217 are recognition of the
substantial value of a remedy that bears some relation to the damages suffered by the plaintiff, but also looks to the deterrent effect
on the defendant. In other areas of the law, decidely noncompensatory damages may be recovered because a straight compensatory
remedy would not act as an adequate deterrent. 218
Wide application o~ the noncompensatory principle would, however, result in an unwarranted intrusion into areas traditionally
reserved for criminal statutes. Consumer class actions are likely to
arise from contractual relationships, and damages should be subject to the general contractual standard of compensatory, nonpunitive
recovery.219 It may of course be argued that a fluid class recovery
is compensatory in the sense that the damages awarded represent
only the amounts that will make the members of the class whole.
But it should be clear that the distribution is punitive from the
defendant's perspective when the repetitive level is so low that the
persons who have suffered damages will not be the beneficiaries of
the residual funds. To avoid this result, the requirement that a court
find some level of repetitive activity before implementation of a
fluid class recovery is a reasonable restraint on its utilization.
Although it is clear that some repetitive activity should be a prerequisite, the difficult problem arises in attempts to determine the
214. See text accompanying note Ill supra.
215. See Pomerantz, supra note 172.
216. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1970).
217. E.g., Hanover Shoe
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
218. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13:
Usury-Legal Rate.-All contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten percent
per annum shall be void, as to principal and interest, and the General Assembly
shall prohibit the same by law; but when no rate of interest is agreed upon, the
rate shall be six per centum per annum.
·
219. See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 81, at 286-92, § 137,
at 560-62 (1935).
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exact quantum of repetitive activity necessary to sustain a fluid class
recovery scheme. Any demand for a high level of repetitive activity
must be balanced with the realization that in many class actions
the refusal to certify the class is tantamount to an absolute denial
of recovery. In Eisen the court found that the number of persons
engaging in odd-lot transactions increased by about five per cent
in each of the two years following the period during which the alleged illegal differentials were charged.220 Assuming this rate of increase has continued, in the five years since initiation of the suit
the number of "new" persons entering the odd-lot market constitutes twenty per cent of the present market. Such calculations
do not take into account the cessation of odd-lot transactions by
some members of the 1962-1966 class so that any fluid class recovery
would benefit a large number of persons, and a substantial percentage of persons relative to the represented class, who did not suffer
damages during the period of alleged illegal activities by the defendants. Yet the court in Eisen concluded that the level of repetitive
activity made a fluid class recovery possible. In contrast to Eisen,
the court in City of Philadelphia refused to authorize a fluid class
recovery because of a lack of repetitive activity. One of the more
confusing statements in the opinion is the assertion that a fluid
class recovery, which results in a windfall to some motorists, would
constitute "a deprivation to the motorist entitled to recovery."221
It is difficult to envision the fluid class recovery as a deprivation to
the consumer motorist class when even the court admits that denial
of certification will mean that none of the nongovernmental members of the Philadelphia-New Jersey class will be able to recover
damages. This paradox illustrates that a requirement of a strict
level of repetitive activity decreases the opportunity to use a fluid
class recovery, and, more importantly, results in denying recovery
to any member of the consumer class on the ground that recovery
by all is not possible. The court in City of Philadelphia made no
specific findings of the degree of repetitive activity present in the
relevant market, and therefore no quantitative comparison with
the Eisen case is possible. But the very fact that the only alternative
to a fluid class recovery will often be no recovery at all should persuade courts to avoid an unreasonably high standard for repetitive
activity.
3.

The Fluid Class Recovery in Perspective

The fluid class recovery does provide an alternative to the calculation of individual damages in class actions, and in that sense
220. 52 F.R.D. at 257.
221. 53 F.R.D. at 72.
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it dramatically reduces the drain on court resources and assists in
the management of large consumer class actions brought under Rule
23(b)(3). But the fluid class recovery also has limitations that, while
not decreasing its advantages when implemented, limit the occasions
when it will be used. These limitations arise from the nature of the
commercial activity in which a defendant may be engaged.
The most obvious prerequisite to implementation of a fluid class
recovery is the calculation of gross damages. The entire concept of
the fluid class recovery revolves around the establishment of a damage fund from which payments for individual claims and litigation
expenses are deducted. In some industries the pricing structure
may be based on such a multitude of variables that calculation of
gross damages is precluded because of an inability to establish an
average margin or typical overcharge. "[T]he key to defendants'
arguments" 222 in City of Philadelphia was the complexity of the gasoline pricing structure. The court concluded that calculation of
individual damages would be impossible even if gross damages
could be established. Indeed, the complexity in pricing suggests
that even gross damages would have been indeterminable, and such
a finding would have precluded the application of a fluid class
recovery.
The requirement of a significant level of repetitive activity will
also serve to reduce the occasions on which a fluid class recovery
will be utilized. But the class action is itself a creature of necessity,
and for this reason the policy of conforming to compensatory principles of damage calculation is likely to give way to the maintenance
of class actions in those situations where failure to allow a fluid
class recovery denies recovery to all.
The most serious limitation to the use of the fluid class recovery
will arise in those cases in which the residual fund is to be returned
to the class over a substantial period of time and the class representative is ill equipped, and no independent regulatory agency
exists, to supervise the return of the fund by the defendant. There
will be times when the anticipated burden of continuing court
responsibility in enforcement of the damage decree will dictate
that a class action not be certified. But none of these limitations can
detract from the contribution that the concept of a fluid class recovery makes to decreasing the manageability problems that would
othenvise arise in many large consumer class actions. The strength
of the fluid class recovery lies in the implicit recognition that class
actions are different from the ordinary adversary proceeding and
require innovative procedures if they are to be fully effective.
222. 53 F.R.D. at 58.

